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This contribution deals with the interdependence of Eastern
and Western Europe in the present historical developments.
It emphasizes the importance to distinguish analytically
between the social and the cultural. Pointing out an
increasing neglect of the social in theory and research
particularly with respect to the post-communist societies of
Eastern and East-Central Europe. As social structure is the
one element which has been changing the fastest in these
societies, the theoretical insights about its relation to culture
are most significant. Given this point of the theoretical
approach it becomes obvious that every assumption of a
more or less coherent Central European culture or from
another point of view post-communist mind must be
misleading. Behind both one can suspect a too holistic
understanding of culture. If we, however, assume that every
cultural pattern requires certain socio-structural support, the
post-communist situation appears rather as a set of different
cultural dimensions than a cultural system homogeniously
organized around coherent principles.
Since the collapse of the communist political system in Eastern
and East-Central Europe at the end of the eighties, the ex-
change of people and commodities across the borderline for-
merly called the Iron Curtain has multiplied. The recent res-
trictive policy at the external border of the EU seems to slow
down this development a little bit as far as the movement of
people is concerned, whereas commodity exchange is still ex-
panding considerably. As borders always indicate the state of923
the system which they surround (Langer, 1996a), one can as-
sume that a lot of change is presently taking place in the soci-
eties on both sides. For the West the respective catchword is
European integration and for the East transition. Within this
frame people are anxiously looking for the directions in which
the systems are moving. The most obvious changes seem to be
economic. The cultural and in particular the social consequen-
ces of this policy have received much less public attention.
The following will not only remind the reader that the cul-
tural is related to the social, but also point to the mutual de-
pendence of European integration and transition in the post-
communist countries.
CHANGE IS THE MAGIC WORD
There is no generation in modern times – particularly not af-
ter World War II – which was not emphatically confronted with
this sometimes threatening, sometimes promising expecta-
tion of social and/or cultural change. Still the speed of change
was variable – sometimes fast and sometimes slow. Recently
it has accelerated. At least for Europe (East and West) this is
no exaggeration if we consider the importance the confronta-
tion between the Communist Bloc and Capitalism had for this
continent. To understand social change one must look into
cultural developments and vice versa. It is not accidental that
among the reasons frequently mentioned for social change is
new technologies. This is something we would consider as 'ma-
terial culture'. But here the emphasis is put on the social context
itself, on challenges from the human environment like the ap-
pearance or disappearance of competing groups.
In this sense European societies have been experiencing
social change for a couple of centuries, especially when com-
pared to medieval times. Just a few examples of changes after
1945: a completely new social order in the countries under So-
viet rule; further decrease of the population involved in agri-
culture in East and West; the shift from core family to various
equal patterns of living together in the West; from work at as-
sembly lines to tele work; from face-to-face to virtual com-
munication; etc.
In contrast to the US version of capitalism, Western Euro-
pean societies became welfare societies. This term in short in-
dicates a balance of power (a socio-structural arrangement) be-
tween the major groups of society (social partnership) but al-
so a high degree of life security for every member of society.
Seen from the standpoints of today with their catchword 'dere-
gulation', it seems that the welfare society was partly just the
price capitalism in this part of the world was willing to pay in








all, Western Europe had some strong communist parties. In
addition, in several countries the socialist parties also had con-
siderable left-wing membership. The capitalist economy had
to take this political situation into account. Therefore the dis-
appearance of the Communist Bloc affects the social struc-
tures in Western Europe much more profoundly than in North
America or in the capitalist societies of Asia, though the most
dramatic changes are taking place in the post-communist coun-
tries themselves.
Now in Western Europe the economic weight is definite-
ly tilting from 'labour' to 'business', the balance seems to be
gone and the whole structure of social partnership is in ques-
tion. Though the reason given for this development is global-
ization of markets, the welfare society most likely would not
have been given up so quickly under a continuous commu-
nist threat. Parallel to the dismantling of the welfare society, the
nation states of Western Europe are ceding more and more
political power to the supranational organizations of the Eu-
ropean Union. Though supranational associations are also get-
ting established in other parts of the world as well (NAFTA,
MERCOSUR etc.), nowhere is the nation state in question as
much as it is in Western Europe. Whereas the extent to which
Western Europe is reorganizing in macro political structures
and labor relations is very much influenced by the disappea-
rance of the Communist Bloc, in other dimensions social rela-
tions change in accordance with the mainstream of (post-) in-
dustrial societies. This applies to institutions like family, me-
dia, education etc. and interpersonal communication. Gene-
rally speaking institutions continue to lose hierarchical struc-
ture and communication is further specifying and fragment-
ing. The new rapidly expanding system of computer mediat-
ed relations is accelerating both.
Whereas Western Europe itself as a group of capitalist
societies seems to be eager to adjust (tuning) its social struc-
ture closer to the US model, the former communist societies
have embarked on a transformation (Srubar, 1994) where al-
most all guiding principles of the past should be abandoned
– from state socialism to capitalism. If we look at the four di-
mensions – capital, power, institutions, communication –
along which major sociological conceptualizations of society
have been achieved, the following can be said:
1) With respect to capital ownership and market econo-
my, most of the post-communist countries in East-Central Eu-
rope, can be considered in economic terms as consolidated
market economies almost a decade after the collapse of com-
munist rule. Primarily these are Hungary, the Czech Repu-







mania are still seen as transitional. The criteria for this rank-
ing is the degree of privatization – the transfer of state-owned
capital to private individuals. More or less parallel to this
process
2) multiparty systems were installed instead of a one
party system and democratic elections (sometimes with inter-
national supervision) were held (Szelenyi et al. , 1996). Both
developments indicate a massive (formal) rearrangement of
social relations. Instead of making arrangements based on so-
lidarity with comrades, former socialist managers – many of
whom now own companies – have had to develop relation-
ships with shareholders, foreign investors, competitors, new
types of influence groups etc. All of these societies have also
seen the implementation of
3) new institutions, for example, the separation of admin-
istration, government and jurisprudence, but also the consti-
tutional right to private property. Old institutions like the fami-
ly sometimes get new functions (e. g. family enterprises, shel-
ters against the risks of a market economy), but sometimes it
is itself in danger through the withdrawal of governmental sup-
port (e. g. privatisation of education, restricting support for
childcare). Finally, familiar
4) communication channels are breaking away in the tran-
sition without immediate replacement. This is true for most of
the communication opportunities once provided by the com-
munist party and other workers’ organizations. Where to find
a structure for communicating and settling conflicting inter-
ests is frequently a question left open.
To summarize the difference in social change between the
societies of the European Union and the post-communist soci-
eties, there is, first of all, a difference between continuity and
discontinuity. Though in Western Europe social change, as we
have tried to show, is also accelerating, it is not yet disruptive
as it is in the East. Here social relationships still develop inside
familiar principles (e. g. competition, corporatism, private pro-
perty) and institutions though with shifting emphasis; there
almost every aspect of social life has been more or less re-
arranged during the past ten years. The tremor caused by the
disappearance of the communist structures (most prominent
in East Germany where it was called ´Abwicklung´) is absorbed
mainly by western supervision and informal social arrange-
ments. Besides that the post-communist societies have also
had to cope with time gaps unknown in the West. By this I do
not mean the wide spread claim of historians and followers of
modernization theory that Eastern Europe had already fallen
behind the West in the 16th century, but rather the expropri-








War II. Now all of these governments practice a kind of resti-
tution of property. In countries like the Czech Republic it is
more open, in others like Hungary it is rather covert.
Together with the (direct or indirect) sell-out of collecti-
vely owned capital to foreign actors and the transfer of capi-
tal to previous managers (or other groups of the so-called no-
menklatura) it is one of the main strategies to establish new
property relations. Legally restitution has some similarity with
heritage in the West but it cannot be the same, simply because
of several decades of communism. Maybe it should rather be
seen as the resurrection of a social group (the owner class).
Whether or not these three economic beneficiaries (foreign ca-
pital, managers, beneficiaries of restitution) of the communist
breakdown can establish social structures similar to the class
of capital owners in Western Europe has yet to be seen. In any
case they are key constituents in the process of class transfor-
mation. Actually it depends on the extent and the efficiency
of restitution whether one would have to speak of transfor-
mation or metamorphoses of classes. In the case of 'metamor-
phoses' significant numbers of individuals of the former no-
menklatura in the short term have moved – or will move – in-
to the new positions of a national capitalist class. Again this is
without precedent in the West. The more the former nomen-
klatura is involved in the new ownership structure, the more
the future of the respective country will depend on the qual-
ity of the criteria applied in the formation of this group under
communism. The question is simply whether these people were
the most intelligent, qualified, and ambitious (personal char-
acteristics necessary to survive in the competitive environ-
ment of capitalism) or only "the dictators, the self appointed
bureaucrats who collectively control the means of produc-
tion, the agencies of coercion, and the media of information"
(Davies 1986, 50). In the latter case they probably will not be
able to play their new roles as capitalist owners or managers
successfully.
It is obvious that social change in the post-communist so-
cieties (Kohn et al. , 1997) has been much faster during the past
decade than in the countries of the EU. For example, nowhere
in the West have institutions, and thus patterns of social rela-
tions, been so radically restructured in such a short time as in
the former communist countries of Eastern Europe. With re-
spect to mutual influence it is now rather the East which influ-
ences the social structures in Western Europe than vice versa.
We have already argued that the extent to which the relation-
ship between labor and capital has tilted towards the latter is
hardly imaginable without the inglorious end of the commu-







pact of the East on Western social structures, additional exam-
ples are not difficult to find. Changes in police organisation, de-
fense, education etc. are very often a direct or indirect re-
sponse to challenges from the post communist societies. The-
refore it should be of utmost importance for the West not only
to observe the economic development but also social changes
in post-communist societies, particularly when future mem-
bership in the European Union is under consideration. The nu-
merous cultural studies already available cannot be a substi-
tute for structural analysis (social change), particularly when
they are based on a narrow concept of culture, including
existing studies that are limited to identity questions in these
societies.
CULTURAL UNCERTAINTIES
Though we emphasize the analytical separation between 'so-
cial' and 'cultural' aspects of human life it is not always easy
to do so in concrete cases. The same holds true when it comes
to the assumption of interdependence. What is valid in prin-
ciple will see certain exceptions when it comes to details. Of
course the cultural development in the European Union deser-
ves attention. Especially after we have already claimed in-
creasing mutual influence in social structure. Still here we will
only give a few examples of new cultural patterns: the build-
ing of the superstructure of the EU is already changing the
value of nation among the young generation (Langer, 1996b); the
dismantling of the welfare state is producing antagonistic
feelings between social groups (e. g. between age groups, be-
tween civil servants and the private sector), the determina-
tion to integrate Europe has resulted in new traffic construc-
tions, such as airports that have to be reorganized because of
the Schengen Agreement; illegal immigration and the fear of
globally acting gangs is changing the security culture; the com-
mon market means more international products on the shelves;
the systematic exchange of students inside the EU is produc-
ing an increase in language capabilities. Many more examples
could be given and need discussion.
In the West the response to the emergence of the post-com-
munist societies in Central and East- Central Europe is very
controversial. On the one hand they are highly welcome, on
the other hand they are met with suspicion and/or neglect.
To get a first access to the state of culture in the post-com-
munist societies, one can begin with having a closer look at
Ostkompetenz, which some countries claim to have. The term
is usually not defined. What is often implied is the assump-
tion that individuals from certain Western countries have a








other post communists. Such claims exist with respect to more
or less all the Western neighbors, for countries from Finland
down to Greece. The reasons given for such a special compe-
tence are usually derived from history. The Finns are supposed
to get along better with Russians because not only did their
country belong to Russia for more than a century, but during
the Soviet time their economy was closely linked to the Soviet
Union.
Another strong example for this claim is Austria, now a
member of EU and for centuries the political and administra-
tive center of the whole region from southern Poland to Tran-
sylvania in the east and the Adriatic in the south, encompass-
ing almost all of what is now considered post-communist in
East-Central Europe. A first challenge for the claim of a special
cultural competence is that the average population on the eas-
tern frontiers of Western Europe responds in a rather igno-
rant manner towards their new neighbors, though the propo-
sition is very often fostered by the media, business and politi-
cians. Contrary to the latter, social surveys show neither a par-
ticular interest in cooperation with post-communist countries
nor the recognition of special cultural similarities (Haller/Gru-
ber, 1996; Langer, 1997).
Besides the opposing empirical indicators, the claim of a
special Ostkompetenz can also be challenged theoretically –
at least in cases where the claim of competence is based on
cultural similarity due to a common past. Communism has so
extensively revolutionized the social structures that not much
common ground can have survived in culture either. Never-
theless, considering the different levels and approaches of
culture we have mentioned before, similarities will appear, but
the question is how relevant they are for bolstering up the pro-
position of a special competence. In the territory of the for-
mer Habsburg Monarchy for example one can still find nu-
merous pieces of architecture (palaces, opera and coffee hou-
ses, public buildings etc.) and technical constructions (rail-
ways, bridges etc.) showing a common origin. This material
cultural heritage can of course release some nostalgic feeling
with Austrians whose country was the only one of the Monarchy
which stayed out of communism. But already a second look
will show that this common cultural ground does not con-
tribute much to cultural competence. First of all the artefacts
have been incorporated into the national tradition of the
countries which emerged from the Monarchy even before
communism and every thread to the whole structure from
which it emerged is often jealously kept out of mind. Se-
condly, the present architecture in these post-communist coun-







today. Another case is, of course, when Austrian construction
companies commission the building. In general, con-struction
in post-communist countries is a question of what one can get
cheaply on the market (shingles from the US, bricks from an
Austrian company, roofing from Yugoslavia, maybe the engine
for the block and pulley welded together oneself etc.) com-
bined with black labor (possibly from the Uk-raine or Roma-
nia), a lot of individual improvisation and no need to bother
about bureaucracy.
Another assumption is the common heritage of social con-
duct (the Viennese Court as the model for good life and be-
havior in the whole of Central Europe). And indeed occasio-
nally one will find emphasis on formal manners (e. g. kiss a
woman´s hand) and etiquette reminiscent of the old days
throughout the region. But this behavior survived only in cer-
tain pockets of the societies. It is well known that the com-
munist nomenklatura at times liked to imitate the aristocracy.
Foreign guests were preferably invited to old palaces where
liveried personnel was serving seven-course meals. Also be-
cause of the fact that communist societies did not allocate la-
bor according to supply and demand, officials on all levels
tried to surround themselves with large numbers of helpers
who also fostered servile behavior. Another social context in
which sometimes old manners and mentalities remain is the
family. Especially when a family was in opposition to the re-
gime, the cultural heritage of the Monarchy helped to pre-
serve identity. This cultural heritage can comprise values, ima-
ges and behavior concerning gender relationships, raising chil-
dren, relations between the generations, how andwhat to eat etc.
Though these and similar phenomena might come from
a common cultural ground in Central Europe, it would be
completely misleading to base it on the claim for a special cross-
cultural competence on the side of Austrians, Germans or other
close Western neighbors. Firstly, these cultural traits survived
in only a few pockets of the post-communist societies and sec-
ondly, in the West most of them have in the meantime com-
pletely disappeared. Even for Austria, formal manners and
etiquette are more a stereotype than a common trait of social
life. The likelihood that it can play as a significant interface in
the relations with post-communist countries is small. Of course
one could go further and look for common habitual traits of
which people are not so much aware but which are not less
important for associating. But the preconditions for this are
rather homogeneous and long-lasting common settings of so-
cialization. It is at least questionable whether the Habsburg rule
and the social exchange processes of those days could ever








in other parts of Europe. The socialisation by national com-
munities and later communist rule was most likely much more
important in this respect.
Hence we doubt very much that the common political
structures of past centuries had such a formative power that
this would justify ascribing a special cross-cultural compe-
tence (Ostkompetenz) for Eastern and East-Central Europe to
natives of Finland, Austria, Germany or maybe Italy. If such a
competence exists at all in the West it is most likely with the
numerous emigrants and refugees from the former Soviet Bloc.
But we do emphasise that the (1) traditional dimension of cul-
ture is a factor in the post-communist societies which should
not be neglected when dealing with them. We do not consid-
er this as belonging to the (2) communist heritage, because the
traditional culture has its roots in a previous era and is not sel-
dom in opposition to the communist-culture. The latter, of
course, still has effects on life in the societies under discussion
and this on all structural levels mentioned above (property re-
lations, politics etc.), but again we do not consider it as the over-
whelming inertia from the past but just as one possible influ-
ence which can support as well as hinder the transition pro-
cess. Neglecting it would be as fatal as overemphasizing it.
To narrow down the communist share in the present cul-
tural situation we must recall the basic social principles of
Real Socialism. The most central principle was the unity of pro-
perty yields and political position. The advantages of proper-
ty in the means of production could only be yielded by the
individual in holding or subordinating to a political position.
This had an impact on all other spheres of life, because defen-
ding or reaching a better standard of living could only be done
through political means. Here we must keep in mind that in
the West property rights are constitutional. The individual ba-
sically can acquire it by economic means as long as politics is
moving inside the frame of the constitution. It is self-evident
that the unity of property rights and political rights causes an
unstable social situation which provokes tight social control,
because otherwise every existing ruling class could be easily
deprived of the advantages of holding property. The democ-
ratic voting mechanism which theoretically existed in the com-
munist societies contained not only the risk for members of
the nomenklatura of losing the political position but also the
surplus value. The resulting political repression certainly had
consequences on culture, which now have to be considered as
the communist heritage.
The resulting uniformity and homogeneity of communist
societies was clearly visible. Uniformity is immanent to every







and needs of daily life there, usually only a very small num-
ber of solutions were offered and that in a simple structure.
Consequently large units were preferred to small. Large was
also dominant in organisations. Their inefficiency together with
ideological control resulted in a deep cleavage between the pu-
blic (office, factory etc.) and private (family, relatives, friends
etc.) spheres of life. The private sphere had to take on all the
needs which, though intended for the public sphere could
not otherwise be met. Under these circumstances a shift of all
kinds of resources (labor, materials, time etc.) from the 'shop'
to the 'home' was unavoidable. It goes without saying, all these
transfers occurred free of charge or for a very low price. Thus
the differentiation of society, hampered by the principle of
keeping politics and property together, came in through the
back door paving the way for the conversion of these soci-
eties one can witness today. The cultural impact of such a sys-
tem was manifold: 1) dilapidated public property (factories, buil-
dings, roads etc.), 2) a significant part of the population own-
ing small second homes (cottages) in the countryside, 3) the
importance of extended families and informal networks of all
kinds, 4) a lack of interest in public concerns (e. g. environ-
ment), 5) a tolerance towards fraud, 6) an avoidance of open
conflicts and 7) an ability to improvise.
Though the rapid conversion of institutions, organisa-
tions and social relations in general made the structural sup-
port for this type of culture disappear, one can expect it to oc-
casionally reappear, because values and behavior usually have
more inertia than social relations, not to mention the materi-
al side of culture which sometimes survives thousands of
years. No doubt some cultural traits from communism will
linger on under the new circumstances before they disappear,
others will develop new meanings and still others will remain
as they are (Laznjak, 1997; Mlinar, 1996; Stuhlhofer, 1997). Un-
der capitalism it is, for example, unlikely that the cottage cul-
ture will continue. Not only will the rising land prices be pre-
ventive, but also bringing people back to work (offices and
factories) at full capacity will not leave them enough time for
such undertakings. Furthermore the need to grow vegetables
and fruits on private lots has already disappeared with the
introduction of a market economy. However, another com-
munist custom is still very resistant to change, namely the
tendency of employees to use company facilities for private
purposes. The low incomes connected with an almost Wes-
tern cost of living in many cases still make a second job nec-
essary, and especially when the second job is an independent
activity, equipment from the first job is likely to be used. This








ment. A trait which has been converted into a new quality is
the former readiness to deceive the state – which has evolved
into a wide spread indifference towards white collar crimes.
This mentality is probably one of the hotbeds of the so-called
'Ostmafia'. Part of this pattern is the lack of determination to
enforce the law. Therefore even in cases where legislators have
set regulations comparable to those in the West, they are not
effective because of a lack of law enforcement. Finally we
would like to give two examples where elements of the post-
communist heritage have a chance to become successfully
incorporated into the emerging new culture of post-commu-
nist societies. One is the ability to improvise, to solve prob-
lems under resource restrictions and other contingencies (Ha-
das/Vörös, 1996). The other example is the (with the exception
of Poland) large agricultural business. If these firms are pro-
fessionally run, they will certainly be a challenge for the small
and medium-sized family farms in Western Europe.
Besides traditionalism and communist heritage there are
two more dimensions which deserve attention when dealing
with the culture of post-communist societies. One could be
described as (3) loss of certainty in orientation, the other as (4)
imitation of Western behavior and products. These dimen-
sions are distinguished on the ground that they have differ-
ent social origins. With loss of orientation we mean mistrust,
no reliability of agreements, apathy etc. The establishing of
civil society, market economy etc. sent a whole generation
(those over fifty) into early retirement with minimum com-
pensation or confronted them with other kinds of status de-
privation. Some of them tried again and made it, but many
ended up in indifference and anger. In business it is not rare
that agreements are not kept and that the discriminated party
still does not strive for justice – an anomic situation. Trust (Fu-
kuyama, 1995) is certainly not entrenched in post-communist
society. We tend not to see this as a heritage but as a new phe-
nomenon related to disappointed expectations in the first
years of transition as well as to an inability (or even unwill-
ingness) to understand the rules of the new society.
Though imitation of Western culture has some limited
examples in the pre-transition time, it could fully unfold only
with the complete opening of information and exchange chan-
nels. There is the imitation of the acceptance of cars as status
symbols, in the travelling behavior of the financially well-off,
fashion etc. As in the dominant opinion, everything from the
past is wrong and bad, Western styles and products have easy
access to these markets. Besides that, communism really did
not leave much to meet the needs of the people. But it seems







neighbors which is imitated but rather the American way of
life as perceived through the mass media.
CONCLUSION
From the point of our theoretical approach it becomes obvi-
ous that every assumption of a more or less coherent 'Central
European culture' or from another point of view 'post-com-
munist mind' must be misleading. Behind both one can sus-
pect a too holistic understanding of culture. If we however as-
sume that every cultural pattern requires certain socio-struc-
tural support, the post-communist situation appears rather as
a set of different cultural dimensions than a cultural system
homogeneously organized around coherent principles. Actu-
ally it is not so much different from the logic of Western cul-
ture if we believe the post-modernists, though the content is
definitely different (Alexander, 1994; Müller, 1995). The di-
mensions we have figured out exist more or less indepen-
dently but have definite socio-structural prerequisites. They
can be circumscribed as a) traditional or pre-communist, b)
communist heritage, c) loss of orientation and c) imitation of
the West. Empirical evidence for this can be found on all lev-
els of culture – the mind (values, perceptions etc.), the behav-
ioral level and the material culture – of the post-communist
societies.
Though it makes theoretical sense to speak of post-com-
munist societies, because social relations were set on new
principles in a rather short term way, from our analysis we
tend to suggest that we should not speak of a post-commu-
nist culture. Like with the 'post-communist mind' this would
suggest a coherence which does not exist. Due to the lack of
coherence it is also difficult to make predictions. The 'imita-
tion of the West' is one factor only and it may not last. To
assume that the post-communist societies will culturally adapt
to Western Europe is not much more plausible than the oppo-
site claim. What if in the future Western Europe will look
more like Eastern Europe today and not the other way ro-
und? We do not suggest this as the most likely scenario but it
cannot be completely excluded. The most likely outcome seems
to us a new European culture influenced from the US as much
as from Eastern Europe. Whether this is desirable from the
point of view of the present population of Western Europe
remains an open question.
What we can conclude from our analysis of culture with
regard to 'Ostkompetenz' is that the assumption that mem-
bers of societies neighboring the post-communist countries in
the West have a cultural advantage in dealing with them –
that is meant by ´Ostkompetenz´ – has basically two roots:934
first the belief in the presence of a common history and, sec-
ondly, the relative strong economic ties of these countries to
the communist bloc in the past. This holds especially true for
countries like Finland and Austria. On the basis of our analy-
sis, we suggest taking such claims very cautiously. If social
structure plays the significant role in the formation of culture
that we assume, then not much of common culture should
have had a chance to survive from history. Another case is the
more frequent dealing with communist institutions. This
expertise is probably still available, but in organizations rather
than in Germans, Finns, Austrians etc. as such. But also here
one must be cautious, because doing business in the post-com-
munist countries follows a new logic, even if sometimes the
communist heritage can be noticed. Considering all this, ´Ost-
kompetenz´ gets a different meaning. It is an ability based on
a general cross-cultural competence which everybody can ac-
quire through experience, studies and careful observation.
Most of all it demands a genuine interest in these societies
which some years ago boldly decided to completely change
their patterns of life (Langer and Feichtinger, 1997).
Social and cultural analysis are not the same. The one
emphasises the ´structure´, the other the ´meaning´. Cultural
analysis can reveal hidden dimensions of social relations, but
commonly does not explain their reproduction. An era in
which cultural analysis is preferred to social analysis indicates
a lack of interest in the moving forces of society. Instead the
mind is occupied with the phenomenology of social life – with
the meaning and not the purpose of relations. Though cul-
ture theory can consider long term guiding principles (e. g. ra-
tionality in the West), it is weak in explaining the circum-
stances of their realisation. Nevertheless socio-structural and
culture analysis can complement each other, they are just dif-
ferent intellectual strategies on a continuum in the endeavor
to understand human conduct and societies; the neglect of
the one or the other will always limit the scope of cognition
and consequently also the number of options to act upon. In
this article we have tried to elaborate this with the example of
the post-communist societies.
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O uzajamnoj ovisnosti socio-kulturnih
promjena u isto~noj i zapadnoj Europi
Josef LANGER
Sveu~ili{te u Klagenfurtu, Klagenfurt
Ovaj je prilog posve}en me|uovisnosti Isto~ne i Zapadne Europe
u dana{njim povijesnim zbivanjima. U njemu se nagla{ava zna-
~aj analiti~kog razlikovanja dru{tvenoga i kulturnoga, nagla{a-
vaju}i rastu}e zanemarivanje dru{tvenoga u teoriji i istra`ivanji-
ma, posebno u odnosu na postkomunisti~ka dru{tva Isto~ne i
Srednjoisto~ne Europe. Kako se u tim dru{tvima upravo socijalna
struktura najbr`e mijenjala, teorijski uvidi u njezin odnos prema
kulturi su vrlo zna~ajni. Imaju}i na umu ovakav teorijski pristup,
postaje bjelodano da svaka pretpostavka manje ili vi{e jedinstve-
ne Srednjoeuropske kulture ili, druga~ije gledano, postkomunis-
ti~koga uma, mora navesti na pogre{an put. U pozadini obaju
stavova mo`e se naslutiti suvi{e holisti~ko razumijevanje kulture.
Ako pak s druge strane pretpostavimo da svaki kulturni obrazac
zahtijeva odre|eno socio-strukturalno zale|e, postkomunisti~ko
stanje se prije pojavljuje kao sklop razli~itih kulturnih dimenzija
nego kao homogeni kulturni sustav ustrojen na temelju
jedinstvenih na~ela.
Über die Wechselwirkung der sozio-
kulturellen Wandel in Ost- und Westeuropa
Josef LANGER
Universität Klagenfurt, Klagenfurt
Dieser Beitrag widmet sich der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit Ost-
und Westeuropas vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen geschicht-
lichen Ereignisse. Es wird die Bedeutung der analytischen
Unterscheidung von Gesellschaftlichem und Kulturellem betont
und auf die wachsende Vernachlässigung des Gesellschaftlichen
verwiesen, wie man sie in Theorie und Forschung vor allem in
den postkommunistischen Gesellschaften Ost- und Mitteleuropas
beobachten kann. Da in diesen Gesellschaften gerade die
soziale Struktur einer beschleunigten Änderung ausgesetzt war,
sind theoretische Einsichten in ihren Bezug zur Kultur äußerst
wichtig. Wenn man einen solchen theoretischen Ansatz verfolgt,
so wird klar, daß eine jegliche Voraussetzung einer mehr oder
minder einheitlichen mitteleuropäischen Kultur oder, anders
betrachtet, eines postkommunistischen Geistes irreführend ist.
Beide der genannten Einstellungen lassen ein übertrieben holi-
stisches Kulturverständnis vermuten. Setzt man nun andererseits
aber wieder voraus, daß jedes Kulturparadigma das Bestehen
eines bestimmten sozio-strukturellen Hintergrundes voraussetzt,
so erscheint der postkommunistische Zustand eher als Komplex
verschiedener Kulturdimensionen denn als homogenes, auf
einheitlichen Grundsätzen fußendes Kultursystem.937
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